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How Do Judges Decide International Relocation Cases? 
 
Rob George
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Abstract: There has been considerable controversy over the approach taken to international 
relocation disputes by the courts of England and Wales, but little has been known about how 
first instance judges approach such decisions in ‘everyday’ relocation cases. This article 
reports the findings of an empirical study in 2012 which looks at case outcomes and judicial 
reasoning in international relocation disputes based on the decisions of trial judges and the 
reports of lawyers. The article analyses case characteristics and some factors which may 
influence case outcomes, and explores the judicial reasoning used to reach those conclusions.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For over a decade, international relocation disputes have remained one of English family 
law’s more controversial issues. These difficult cases involve the application by one parent 
for permission to remove their child permanently
1
 from the United Kingdom against the other 
parent’s wishes. Until recently, the leading authority remained the 2001 Court of Appeal 
decision in Payne v Payne,
2
 interpreted in the light of the 2011 Court of Appeal case of K v K 
(Relocation: Shared Care Arrangement).
3
 The most recent decision, Re F (International 
Relocation Cases),
4
 reduces the significance of Payne and calls for a holistic, case-specific 
analysis. 
 
While relocation law has been subjected to significant criticism,
5
 little is known about the 
reality of these cases as they are being decided on the ground. The focus of scholars’ 
attention has understandably been on the principles as set out by appellate judges, together 
with the decisions of those few reported first instance cases. Work which has asked about 
everyday decision-making in relocation cases has approached the question indirectly, talking 
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to practitioners about their experiences.
6
 This work is valuable, not least in understanding the 
wider processes involved in family dispute resolution of which, of course, the family court is 
only part. However, such research inevitably gives a somewhat detached perspective, asking 
judges and practitioners in the abstract rather than examining actual decisions.  
 
At the same time, a major debate in England and Wales about relocation law is whether leave 
to remove a child from the jurisdiction is granted too easily. This important debate has been 
significantly hampered by a lack of knowledge about the proportion of applications that is, in 
fact, allowed. More generally, little is known about the people involved in relocation 
disputes, such as where they are seeking to go and why, how old their children are, and so on.  
 
This paper reports the findings of empirical work carried out in 2012 designed to shed light 
on these issues. In particular, the following questions are addressed:  
 (1) What are the characteristics of international relocation cases decided by courts in 
England and Wales, in terms of the families involved and case details?  
 (2) What are the outcomes of litigated cases in terms of applications being allowed or 
refused, and what variables appear to influence those outcomes?  
 (3) How are judgments constructed in international relocation cases to allow judges to 
reach these conclusions?  
 
INTERNATIONAL RELOCATION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
As with all private law disputes about children’s upbringing, the welfare of the child is the 
court’s paramount consideration in a relocation dispute,7 supplemented by the welfare 
checklist in s 1(3) of the Children Act 1989. In addition, when the cases being discussed in 
this article were decided, the courts remained focused on the guidance from Payne, which 
highlighted factors of particular relevance to the relocation context. In Thorpe LJ’s judgment, 
a so-called ‘discipline’ was set out:8 the discipline asked about the applicant’s motivation and 
the level of planning that had gone into the application, followed by the respondent’s 
motivations, and then the effect of a refusal of the application on the applicant, all of which 
was said to be relevant to an overall analysis of welfare. Similar guidance was given by the 
then-President of the Family Division, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss,
9
 though in the years 
following Payne it was Thorpe LJ’s judgment which dominated judicial thinking.  
 
The Payne guidance, particularly Thorpe LJ’s ‘discipline’, was once ‘commonly seen as 
walking and talking like a presumption’ in favour of relocation applications being allowed.10 
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However, more recent decisions – especially K v K (Relocation: Shared Care 
Arrangement),
11
 which was decided shortly before the cases reported in this research were 
decided, and Re F (Relocation),
12
 which was decided three quarters of the way through the 
sampling period for this research – made clear that Payne was intended to guide judges in the 
factors which they might need to consider, but not as to the outcomes they should reach.
13
 In 
practical terms, this was generally thought to mean that the ‘rigour’ with which judges are 
approaching applications increased: the impression that a relocation application is almost 
bound to succeed was dying away in 2012 when this research was conducted.
14
 
Consequently, although the guidance itself did not change, it was thought that the way in 
which judges approached cases using the guidance did. 
 
The approach to international relocation cases has subsequently shifted again, with the 2015 
Court of Appeal decision in Re F (International Relocation Cases).
15
 Here, the appeal court 
said for the first time that following Payne’s guidance may amount to an error of law if the 
facts of the case being decided call for a broader (or simply different) approach; the count 
commended a global, holistic analysis of all factors, and a parallel analysis of the various 
proposals being put forward in an assessment of welfare. While this approach draws heavily 
on K v K, it marks a change of emphasis from the position as understood before mid-2015;
16
 
when thinking about the cases discussed in this article, it is therefore important to keep in 
mind the legal landscape at the time, and how it appears to have shifted subsequently.  
 
SUMMARY OF METHODOOGY 
 
This paper reports findings from two related studies.
17
 The first study, which is the principal 
source of data, comprises 96 judicial decisions in international relocation cases in the 
calendar year 2012, and referred to as the Court Case (‘CC’) sample. The CC sample 
comprises 96 international relocation decisions where either the court’s order (N=43), the 
court’s judgment (N=53), or both (N=20) were provided. For obvious reasons, judgments 
provide a great deal more information than orders alone, though most orders submitted 
contained detailed recitals and other information, and even the most basic usually contained 
considerable information. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that in the cases where only the 
order was available, less information was available and so the analysis that can be performed 
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on those decisions is more limited. All 96 cases contribute to the quantitative part of this 
study, and the 53 cases where judgments were provided underpin the qualitative part.  
 
The second study, designed to augment and test the reliability of the CC sample, comes from 
52 questionnaire responses from family lawyers in England and Wales between October 2012 
and January 2013, and referred to as the Research Questionnaire (‘RQ’) sample. These 52 
cases augment the quantitative part of this paper, but not the qualitative.  
 
Because the CC and RQ samples ask about cases decided in the same period, there is obvious 
scope for overlap. Cases were analysed for overlaps, looking at key characteristics such as 
number and age of children and proposed destination country. Nine likely overlap cases were 
identified in this way.
18
 When the two samples are analysed separately, all cases are kept in 
each sample; however, in places the two samples are combined and then the nine overlap 
cases are included only once. Where this is done, the CC cases are used, since the CC sample 
is more reliable: the data come directly from court documents, whereas the RQ sample relies 
on practitioners’ recollection, potentially some months after their involvement with the case 
ended.  
 
QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS 
 
Case Outcomes 
 
England has traditionally been seen as a ‘pro-relocation’ jurisdiction, with applications to 
remove a child from the jurisdiction perceived to be treated comparatively favourably.
19
 
However, while some other countries have researched case outcomes to test this question, no 
work has previously been done in England and Wales, so making it difficult to know whether 
the perception is reflected in practice. The position in Canada (perceived as ‘neutral’ when it 
comes to relocation applications) and New Zealand (perceived as ‘anti-relocation’) make for 
useful broad-brush comparators, though the different methodologies used for collecting cases 
in different studies mean that caution is needed in making direct comparison. In Canada, 
Rollie Thompson’s research (which involved only reported cases, though a high proportion 
are reported in Canada) showed an overall success rate of 68% for international applications 
going outside North America.
20
 Similarly, Mark Henaghan’s New Zealand study (which 
involved all first instance decisions in that jurisdiction) also showed an overall success rate of 
68% for international cases in the courts in that country.
21
 Given that these jurisdictions are 
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said to represent different approaches to relocation, it is noteworthy that the reported success 
rates of applications appear so similar.  
 
The two datasets in this study yield slightly different findings from each other in terms of 
overall outcomes: the CC sample had an overall success rate of 71.9%, the RQ cases 59.6%; 
when the two datasets are combined (and the supposed duplicates discounted), the overall 
success rate is 66.7%. Whichever percentage is used, the comparison with the results of the 
(broadly comparable) studies in other jurisdictions, as shown in Table 1, is interesting: 
apparently challenging the standard depictions of these jurisdictions as respectively pro-, 
neutral, and anti- regarding relocation, the findings show little difference in these broad terms 
between the court outcomes in the three jurisdictions.
22
  
 
Table 1: Table showing the percentage of international relocation applications that 
were allowed in the CC and RQ datasets, and in studies from Canada and New 
Zealand 
Data Set N Percentage of Cases where 
Relocation Is Allowed 
 
INT CC 
 
96 71.9 
 
INT RQ, Judicially Determined Cases Only 
 
52 59.6 
INT CC and RQ Combined 
 
139 66.7 
International Relocation Cases in Canada, 
2005-10 (‘neutral’) 
47 68.0 
International Relocation Cases in New 
Zealand, 2011-12 (‘anti-relocation’) 
44 68.0 
 
Of course, the results of court litigation do not tell the whole story, because cases which reach 
the courts are filtered in various ways by pre-litigation advice and decision-making, all of 
which (it is generally assumed) takes place in the shadow of the law,
23
 influenced by people’s 
perceptions of the law as well as non-legal factors and individual bargaining chips. In the 
relocation context, earlier research has suggested that the advice that lawyers give to potential 
applicant and respondent parents varies considerably from country to country,
24
 and this is 
likely to affect the overall picture of relocation case outcomes. On the other hand, the 
proportion of international relocation cases which settle is thought to be relatively low.
25
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 While it is interesting and important to know the overall success rates for international 
relocation cases in this sample, the next question is to look at the factors which affect those 
case outcomes. It is not the case that every relocation application has an equal chance of 
succeeding. Practitioners have long argued that the motivation of the applicant probably is, 
and certainly should be, a factor influencing whether the relocation should be allowed or 
not;
26
 and more recently, the English courts have placed renewed focus on the importance of 
the child’s existing care arrangements before the relocation dispute begins as a factor which 
may influence the decision about relocation.
27
 Consequently, the analysis now moves to look 
at factors which, from a statistical perspective, appear to be relevant to the decision-making 
which leads to the overall outcomes reported above. 
 
Factors Influencing Case Outcomes  
 
The study approaches this analysis using different methodological techniques. The first, 
called an Information Gain Score (IGS) analysis, ranks each of the variables according to 
how much additional information that variable provides when predicting outcomes.
 
The 
results of that analysis are reported in an earlier paper,
28
 their main function being to guide 
further work using other methods. The findings of that further work are set out here, divided 
into two broad sections.  
 
 Families and biographical characteristics  
 
First, we can note that, in line with anecdotal reports, the vast majority of applicants in this 
study were mothers. In the CC sample, 93% of applicants were mothers, 5% were fathers, 
and 2% were grandparents; in the RQ sample, 95% were mothers and 5% fathers. This 
pattern is broadly similar to that in other countries; for example, a Canadian study of 
relocation decisions from 2001 to 2010 showed 92% of applicants were mothers, 7% were 
fathers and 1% were non-parents.
29
  
 
One of the most complete pieces of data available in the study is the children’s ages. In the 
CC sample (N=140 children), the mean age was 6.75 years, while in the RQ sample (N=88 
children) it was 7.9 years. The spread of ages is illustrated in Figure 1, where the percentage 
of children of each age in each sample is shown on a bar chart (with percentages used for 
ease of comparison). It can be seen that while the RQ sample has a single peak at 8 years, the 
CC sample has a higher percentage of children of pre-school age. It is not known why the two 
samples would be different in this respect.
30
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 It is also notable that in both samples, children over the age of about 10 or 11 feature 
relatively infrequently. When we look later at the qualitative analysis of court judgments, one 
reason why this might be the case is that older children’s views are more influential in 
decision-making, and so parents may settle litigation (or not start it at all) in some cases 
involving an older child, once the child’s views are known.  
 
However, that possible pre-litigation filter issue aside, the data do not support the suggestion 
that the children’s ages might affect case outcomes. Indeed, case outcomes are stable 
whatever the age of the child involved.
31
   
 
Figure 1: Bar chart showing the percentage of children of each age in each of the CC 
and RQ samples 
 
 
Another issue to consider is the care arrangements in place for children prior to the relocation 
application. One might expect to find that the more the child’s day-to-day care was shared by 
the respondent parent, the less likely it would be that a relocation application would succeed. 
The intellectual justification for this approach would be that such a child has ‘more to lose’ 
by relocating, in terms of his or her relationship with the respondent parent, but also that an 
existing shared care arrangement would allow the child more readily to remain in the present 
location in the main care of the respondent parent if the applicant parent decided to relocate 
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32
 
 
Table 2 shows the success rates for international relocation applications in the two data 
samples.
33
 Cases were classified as ‘shared care’ where the child spent at least 35% of time 
with each parent, ‘overnight stays’ where there was overnight time but less than 35%, ‘direct 
contact’ where there was no (or no regular) overnight time, and ‘no direct contact’ where the 
child had no face-to-face time with a parent; there was also an ‘other’ category, for cases 
where (for example) a non-parent was also involved in the child’s main care, or where the 
respondent parent was the main carer.
34
 In the CC sample, this information was assessed by 
the researchers either directly or indirectly from the court documents; in the RQ sample, 
respondents reported the care arrangements that had been in place. It can be seen that in the 
CC sample, the success rates of applications follow the approximate pattern that would be 
expected, with shared care cases least likely be allowed and no contact cases most likely to 
be. However, the RQ sample shows almost no difference between the main categories of care 
arrangement, which may lead to more doubt about the overall picture. In any case, the 
differences are not statistically significant in either dataset, so the differences seen may 
simply be the result of random chance. 
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Table 2: Table showing success rates for international relocation applications in the 
CC and RQ samples, and in the two combined, for different pre-relocation child care 
arrangements 
Care 
arrangement 
CC Cases RQ Cases CC and RQ Combined 
N 
Success 
rate (%) 
N 
Success 
rate (%) 
N 
Success 
rate (%) 
All cases 
where care 
arrangements 
known 
71 66.2 51 60.8 118 61.9 
Shared care 
arrangement 
(35% <) 
8 50.0 16 56.3 24 54.2 
Some 
overnight 
stays 
43 60.5 22 50.0 63 55.6 
Direct contact, 
no overnight 
stays  
11 72.7 6 50.0 16 62.5 
No direct 
contact 
5 100.0 3 100.0 8 100.0 
Other care 
arrangements 
4 100.0 4 100.0 7 100.0 
 
That caveat – given the inevitable limitations of the dataset – aside, these findings might 
incline us to suggest that cases involving no overnight contact with the respondent parent are 
more likely to be allowed than those involving at least some overnight stays. However, it is 
more difficult to know whether, once that line has been crossed, the amount of sharing of 
care makes any difference: the CC data suggest that it does, but the RQ and combined data 
are more equivocal. Further work is needed to clarify this issue. Interestingly, as noted below 
in the court judgments analysis,
35
  judges seldom varied their language in describing the 
relationship between the child and the non-moving parent. Save where that parent presented 
some kind of risk to the child, they were commonly described as, for example, having ‘a very 
loving and close relationship’, whatever type of care arrangement was in place.  
 
A separate issue which the data seem to suggest may be of some relevance is the applicant 
parent’s current relationship status, whether married, cohabiting, and so on.36 As the figures 
in Table 3 show, it seems that in this sample those applicants who were in some kind of 
stable relationship had a higher chance of their applications succeeding than those who were 
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not in an on-going relationship.
37
 
 
Table 3: Table showing success rates for international relocation applications in the CC 
sample for different current relationship statuses of the applicant parent 
 
Current relationship type 
APPLICANT PARENTS 
N Success rate (%) 
All cases where relationship status 
known 
47 68.1 
 
Married 
 
17 82.4 
 
Engaged 
 
2 [100.0] 
 
Cohabiting  
 
4 [75.0] 
Non-cohabiting relationship 4 [75.0] 
No on-going relationship 20 50.0 
[ ] = small numbers, therefore percentages should be interpreted with caution 
 
Looking in more detail at the applicants who are married or engaged compared with those 
who are not in an on-going relationship, some striking differences emerge. For example, 
amongst the 19 single applicants from whom this information is known, none was a British 
national seeking to emigrate, whereas 14 of the 19 married or engaged applicants were. 
Similarly, the vast majority of single applicants were seeking to relocate in order to return 
home (80%) or to get increased family support (80%); between them, these reasons 
accounted for nine out of ten cases involving single applicants. Of the remaining two cases, 
one was based on a job offer abroad,
38
 while the other was seen as a pure ‘lifestyle’ 
decision.
39
  
 
Amongst the married applicants, on the other hand, the clear majority were bringing an 
application based primarily on a factor related to their new spouse. In some cases, he was 
already in the new location (N=6), while in other cases he was seeking to return to his 
original home country (N=5). Four of these eleven cases also involved the new partner 
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having a job offer, and job offers for the partner were the main basis for a further three cases. 
A few applications amongst the married group were based on the applicant herself seeking to 
return to her original home country (N=3) or were pure ‘lifestyle’ cases (N=2). 
 
It is interesting to wonder how best to understand these patterns. Are judges concerned to 
protect applicants’ new relationships, which some authorities suggest will struggle if a new 
partner is prevented from pursuing his life ambitions involving relocation, so as to try to 
avoid the children experiencing a second relationship breakdown?
40
 Do some judges take the 
view that children need a father-figure in their lives, and so keep children of single applicants 
near the respondent fathers while allowing re-partnered applicants to move because this role 
is seen as being performed by the step-father?
41
 Alternatively, is it that judges are generally 
less impressed by applications premised on a desire by the applicant to return ‘home’, but 
find those cases motivated by new partners or their careers more compelling? 
 
Curiously, this aspect does not feature strongly in judicial reasoning. Judges frequently talked 
about the effect of a refusal of the application, but rarely linked this discussion to issues 
relating to new partners. As we will see,
42
 the focus was more often on the applicant’s present 
life in this jurisdiction and, in many cases, a need for support in the proposed destination 
country, neither of which tended to be linked to new partners.  
 
 Relocation Destinations and Motivations  
 
The second broad category of findings relates to the destinations of the proposed relocations, 
and the parties’ motivations in seeking or opposing such a move. Starting with proposed 
relocation destinations, most international applications involve to one of three groups of 
countries: countries within the EU, countries in North America, and countries in Australasia; 
for the purposes of this analysis, other destinations are treated together as a collective ‘other’ 
group. Table 4 shows the success rates for applications in these four groups for the CC and 
RQ data sets, and for the two combined. 
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Table 4: Table showing success rates for relocation applications in the CC and RQ 
samples, and in the two combined, for different proposed destinations 
Proposed 
relocation 
destination 
CC Cases RQ Cases CC and RQ Combined 
N 
Success 
rate (%) 
N 
Success 
rate (%) 
N 
Success 
rate (%) 
All cases 
where 
destination 
known 
95 72.6 51 60.8 139 67.6 
European 
Union 
35 80.0 20 50.0 54 68.5 
North 
America 
21 71.4 13 61.5 31 64.5 
Australia / 
New 
Zealand 
23 52.2 10 [60.0] 32 56.3 
Other 
destinations 
16 87.5 8 [87.5] 22 86.4 
[ ] = small values, therefore percentages should be interpreted with caution. 
 
The CC data, on the left side, appear to tell a fairly coherent story: put simply, the further 
away the proposed destination, the less likely it was that the relocation would be allowed. 
The RQ cases, on the other hand, tell a different and in many ways less clear story. Proposed 
moves to the EU here had the lowest success rate (50.0%), and there is little difference 
between North American cases (61.5%) and Australasian cases (60.0%). The big variation in 
outcomes for EU cases between the CC and RQ data is particularly puzzling, since this group 
is the largest in both datasets and ought, therefore, to be least vulnerable to random 
fluctuations. Looking deeper, though, there may be reason to think that the RQ sample of EU 
moves is populated with ‘unusual’ cases. For example, while just 5.7% of the CC sample of 
EU moves (N=35) were heard in the High Court (either by full time Judges or by Deputies), 
almost a third (31.3%) of RQ cases to the EU were heard in that court (N=16). Consequently, 
there may be reasons to think that the CC sample is more ‘typical’,43 and so to give greater 
weight to the higher success rate for EU applications seen in that data. This interpretation also 
fits with a more natural explanation of the patterns in the data, since it makes more sense if 
comparatively short-distance moves within the EU should be allowed more frequently than 
proposed relocations to the other side of the world.
44
  
 
Turning to applicants’ reasons for seeking to relocate, earlier research in other countries has 
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shown that most applicants give several reasons.
45
 Consequently, while we can look, for 
example, at all cases where the applicant was seeking to ‘return home’ to her original 
country, and at cases which involved a move for a new job, some cases will fall into both 
groups.  
 
Table 5 breaks down cases by reference to the three main reasons given: returning home, 
moving to take up a new job that the applicant or her new partner had been offered, or 
moving for a generally improved lifestyle; plus a catch-all ‘other reasons’ category. Since the 
categories are not mutually exclusive, the total number of cases for each dataset is less than 
the sum of each reason for moving. 
 
Table 5: Table showing success rates for international relocation applications in the 
CC and RQ samples, and in the two combined, for different primarily reasons given by 
the applicant for seeking to relocate 
Reason for 
seeking 
relocation 
CC Cases RQ Cases CC and RQ Combined 
N 
Success 
rate (%) 
N 
Success 
rate (%) 
N 
Success 
rate (%) 
All cases 
with known 
reasons  
75 72.0 52 59.6 123 65.9 
Return to 
applicant’s 
original 
country 
42 73.8 23 73.9 61 72.1 
New job for 
applicant or 
partner 
16 93.8 25 56.0 40 70.0 
Lifestyle 
choice 
21 47.6 21 52.4 40 47.5 
Other 
reasons  
9 [66.7] 5 [40.0] 14 57.1 
[ ] = small values, therefore percentages should be interpreted with caution 
NB: Categories of reasons for seeking relocation are not mutually exclusive, therefore the sum of all reasons is greater than 
the total number of cases. 
 
These data again suggest a somewhat confused picture between the two datasets, with the CC 
data suggesting that moving for a new job has a significantly higher chance of success while 
moving to go home is about average, whereas the RQ data show the exact opposite. Both 
datasets show that lifestyle choice cases are less likely to succeed than any other reason, 
though, and this finding is statistically significant in both the court case and combined 
datasets. This finding is consistent with practitioners’ views from earlier research suggesting 
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that ‘lifestyle choice cases are the hardest to [succeed in bringing]’.46 
 
Finally, we can look briefly at the way in which some of these factors appear to interact.
47
 
Most interesting is the interaction between the proposed destination and the applicant’s 
principal reason for seeking to relocate, as set out in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Table showing success rates for relocation applications in the CC sample, 
divided into the main geographic locations of the proposed destinations, for different 
primarily reasons given by the applicant for seeking to relocate 
Reason for 
seeking 
relocation 
 
European Union 
 
North America 
Australia / New 
Zealand 
N= 
Success 
rate (%) 
N= 
Success 
rate (%) 
N= 
Success 
rate (%) 
All cases 
where reasons 
known 
28 78.6 16 68.8 18 50.0 
Return to 
applicant’s 
original home 
country 
18 83.3 10 70.0 7 [42.9] 
New job for 
applicant or 
partner 
5 [100.0] 2 [100.0] 5 [80.0] 
Lifestyle 
choice 
6 [33.3] 5 [80.0] 10 40.0 
[ ] = small values, therefore percentages should be interpreted with caution. NB: Categories of reasons for 
seeking relocation are not mutually exclusive, therefore the sum of all reasons will be greater than the total 
number of cases. 
 
The pattern is not entirely consistent between the three groups of destinations, and the small 
numbers in many of the categories mean that significant caution is needed when looking at 
many of the percentages. But the patterns amongst these cases are largely unsurprising, given 
the previous data seen. For example, permission to move to Australia in ‘lifestyle’ cases was 
particularly unusual, whereas ‘going home’ to EU countries was very often allowed.  
 
 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF COURT JUDGMENTS 
 
So far, the analysis in this article has focused primarily on individual variables and how they 
may impact on case outcomes. In practice, of course, each case involves many variables 
which interact. As noted at the end of the previous section, some multi-variable analysis can 
be done in a statistical way, but that analysis can inevitably only go so far, because the 
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outcomes of court cases depend upon considerations which simply cannot be quantified. If 
we knew that factors x, y and z added up led to outcome 1, and factors a, b and c added up led 
to outcome 2, there would be little need for courts at all. The reality is that many of the 
considerations which inform judicial reasoning and hence court outcomes are not quantifiable 
in this way. In particular, the personalities of the people involved often have an effect – even 
a decisive effect – on the judge’s decision.48 Consequently, we turn now to look at judges’ 
reasoning as expressed in judgments as a way better to understand how various factors fit 
together in leading to case outcomes.  
 
In looking at the 53 judgments available for this analysis, a number of themes can be 
identified. First, it is interesting to see how the judges constructed the law itself, particularly 
as this issue is particularly difficult and, perhaps, controversial following K v K.
49
 From there, 
we turn to look at particular issues raised by the Payne guidance which are of especial 
relevance to the overall reasoning processes seen in the judgments.  
 
Constructions of the law  
 
 The treatment of the Payne guidance 
 
In general, judges did not engage in lengthy discussion of the law relevant to relocation cases. 
Most cases quoted the key summaries from Payne,
50
 and many judges proceeded to address 
each of the points raised using headings based on either Thorpe LJ’s ‘discipline’ or Butler-
Sloss P’s ‘guidance’ (or sometimes both). Other authorities were mentioned intermittently.51 
Most judges also gave express consideration to the items on the welfare checklist.
52
 
 
While judges frequently reiterated that ‘[i]t is imperative ... that the court heeds the words of 
caution of the Court of Appeal in K v K and avoids the risk of elevating the guidance in 
Payne to the status of principle or, worse still, presumption’,53 only occasionally did they 
make evaluative comments about the authorities. One District Judge discussed at some length 
various criticisms of Payne before somewhat begrudgingly saying that ‘I shall ... submit to 
the “discipline” suggested by Lord Justice Thorpe’.54  
 
The only point on which there was any real variation in approaches was about cases 
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involving shared care arrangements, which was described by one judge as a ‘particularly 
vexed question’.55 There were two clear views in the eight cases where this issue was 
discussed.
56
 One was that the court’s approach would be different in a shared care 
application, and therefore that ‘[w]hether or not this is a shared care case is a question, in my 
judgment, which I need to deal with at the outset of any discussion of the relevant law’.57 For 
these judges, a finding of shared care meant that the Payne guidance was often given little 
further attention, whereas if the judge declined to label the arrangements as such then Payne 
was the court’s focus. It is interesting to wonder whether some judges might have used this 
labelling as a means of reinforcing a decision already made on another basis: for example, if 
a judge were inclined to refuse a relocation application for other reasons then categorising the 
case as ‘shared care’ might help to bolster that conclusion if Payne is seen as not applying to 
shared care cases. There is no way to assess whether this is so from court judgments, but 
earlier work suggests that judges may be conscious of these considerations.
58
 
 
Other judges rejected the idea that shared care cases called for a different legal approach – 
‘the court should not categorise cases in accordance with the concepts of primary or shared 
care’.59 In a clear reflection of the arguments put forward by counsel, judges in this group 
often commented that they were ‘not assisted ... by attempting to decide who was the primary 
carer’.60 These judges avoided any classification, but were happy to state (as Black LJ had 
done in K v K) that ‘the guidance set out in Payne carries less weight’ in cases involving truly 
shared care.
61
  
 
It is likely that this confusion over shared care relocation cases has been resolved by the 
October 2012 decision in Re F (Relocation),
62
 wherein Munby LJ reiterated the non-
classificatory approach and declared that Moore-Bick and Black LJJ represented the majority 
in K v K,
63
 and more so by Ryder LJ’s decision in Re F (International Relocation Cases). 
However, it is clear that throughout 2012 there was variation in approaches to these cases, 
and judges felt compelled to engage with these questions.  
 
 Human rights law 
 
                                                 
55
 CC-81, [104].  
56
 Not all of the cases discussing this issue were classified as shared care cases – judges sometimes discussed 
the controversy but then determined that the facts of the case fell outside the shared care area. 
Consequently, the 8 cases here do not correspond exactly with the 8 shared care cases shown in Table 2; 
in 3 of those cases, only an order was sent to the study, so no comment can be made about the judges’ 
approaches in their judgments.  
57
 CC-23, [42]; also CC-27, [7]; CC-12, [33] and CC-54, [29]. 
58
 Relocation Disputes, pp 69-71 and 78-79.  
59
 CC-96, [5].  
60
 CC-61, [36].  
61
 CC-67, [19].  
62
 [2012] EWCA Civ 1364, [2013] 1 FLR 645 
63
 On the confusion over the ratio of K v K, see R. George, ‘Reviewing Relocation?’ [2012] CFLQ 110. 
Another legal point, conspicuous primarily by its absence, was discussion of human rights 
issues. Very few cases even mentioned the rights of the children, parents or others involved; 
those that did contained only perfunctory comments. The handful of cases where rights were 
mentioned fell into two groups. In one group, the mention of rights involved a purely abstract 
acknowledgement that the parties had rights which were engaged by the decision:  
 
I am also acutely conscious of each of the parties’ Article 6 and Article 8 rights under the 
human Rights Act and, in coming to my decision, I have all of that at the forefront of my 
mind.
64
 
 
The other group of cases involved judges going one step further and noting (still only in the 
abstract) that any interference with Article 8 rights needs to be necessary and proportionate 
and in the pursuit of a legitimate aim. Two cases – which mark the high point of the rights 
analysis in the relocation judgments – put the issue in these ways:  
 
This order does affect each party’s rights to family life under the European Convention. 
The interference in the father’s is merited by the welfare interests of his son and is 
proportionate.
65
 
 
[In allowing relocation] I would interfere with the father’s right to family life pursuant to 
Article 8 ECHR, which I can only do if I consider it necessary and proportionate. I do 
consider it necessary and proportionate to do so.
66
 
 
It would be easy to criticise these judgments for their minimal engagement with the 
potentially substantial interferences with the rights of the parties involved. But these judges at 
least commented expressly, albeit minimally, on the human rights issues in their judgments. 
In practice in the relocation cases in this study, therefore, human rights issues were not a 
central focus for judges. However, human rights issues have a potentially substantial effect 
on analysis of the issues.
67
 It is not that judges should undertake a rights analysis as a sort of 
pro forma, but their analysis of ‘the entire family situation’ needs to demonstrate that they 
have engaged in an overarching balancing of interests.
68
 A mere acknowledgement of rights 
or assertion of proportionality may not advance matters much, and may not be adequate to 
allow an appeal court to review the judge’s ‘compliance or otherwise’ with human rights 
obligations.
69
 That said, although the Court of Appeal in Re Y suggested that no separate 
analysis of Article 8 is required in private law children cases,
70
 in Re F (International 
Relocation Cases) Ryder LJ held that in a case involving a potential international relocation 
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the potential for an interference with Article 8 rights means that a clear and separate 
proportionality evaluation may be required. Quite what this involves is not spelt out by Ryder 
LJ, but experience in the public law field suggests that a careful assessment involving the 
parallel analysis of all realistic options can be done in a way which involves the 
proportionality assessment and overall balancing exercise required under Article 8.
71
 
 
Factors coming from Payne 
 
 The applicant’s proposals  
 
Both judgments in Payne ask about the applicant’s proposals. Judges usually scrutinised the 
substance of applicants’ relocation proposals in great detail. For example, in many cases 
where relocation was refused, judges made critical remarks about the details of the plans. 
While occasionally these criticisms were substantive,
72
 a more common criticism was that the 
plans were ‘vague’,73 ‘ill thought out and ... over-ambitious’,74 or ‘not well evidenced’.75 
While, of course, these remarks may have been entirely justified, a plan that one person sees 
as ‘over-ambitious’ could be considered exciting and potentially highly rewarding by another. 
For example, in another case the judge said of the mother:  
 
I accept that she may not have dotted every ‘i’ and crossed very ‘t’, but frankly ... the 
mother seems to me to be so capable that any unexpected obstacle could – and would – be 
easily overcome by her.
76
  
 
In the end, while judges spoke at greater length about practicalities, their views about the 
each parent’s truthfulness and reliability often seemed more influential.  
 
The broad pattern was that unsuccessful parents were the subject of criticism from judges 
about what they had claimed or the way in which they had claimed it. For example, in about 
half the cases where relocation was refused, judges were concerned about the applicant 
parent’s attitude to contact and her trustworthiness in relation to the child’s on-going 
relationship with the father. One or two cases appeared to turn entirely on these findings, 
such as CC-55, an application to move with children aged 8 and 7 to the United States. The 
judge found that the ‘cunning and manipulative’ mother ‘seeks to undermine contact’; her 
‘very abusive’ comments about the father were ‘indicative of the depth of hatred’ she felt.77 
                                                 
71
 The European Court of Human Rights sometimes takes the same view: see, eg, YC v United Kingdom 
(Application No 4547/10) [2012] 2 FLR 332 (ECtHR). 
72
 For example, CC-13 involved the mother proposing to leave her job in London and go to Canada, where 
she had no other connections and where she would commute for nearly 3 hours each day for 4 hours of 
low-paid work which would barely cover the costs of childcare.  
73
 CC-90, judge’s cover note.  
74
 CC-55, [87].  
75
 CC-39, [5]. 
76
 CC-67, [20].  
77
 CC-55, [77], [51], and [70] respectively. 
 On the other hand, cases where relocation was allowed were characterised by adverse 
remarks about the respondent parent’s attitude to the child or to the applicant parent,78 often 
coupled with negative comments about his evidence at the hearing. The latter of these ranged 
from mild remarks about the father ‘not being completely frank’,79 through more significant 
findings that the father was ‘a dishonest man’,80 and giving evidence which was ‘in parts 
excessive and in parts false’.81 
 
 The effect of relocation on the child’s relationship with the non-moving parent 
 
Payne next asks about the effect of a relocation on the non-moving parent, and about the 
steps that can be taken to offset the loss of relationship with the child, about which judges 
expressed a variety of views. With the exception of those handful of cases where the fathers 
represented a safety risk to the children, judgments almost invariably spoke of there being ‘a 
very loving and close relationship’,82 where ‘it goes without saying that this child has a strong 
bond with her father’.83 Indeed, so similar were the comments across the body of cases that, 
looking just at these sections of the judgments, it would be difficult to differentiate between 
those applications that were granted and those that were refused. A similar convergence of 
language is seen in those cases where judges spoke about the loss of the ‘everyday parenting 
experience’ – what Eleanor King J once described as ‘lying around on a sofa on a Saturday 
evening, eating pizza and watching a DVD with your dad, or being taken to school by him 
every other Monday’.84 
 
By contrast, a small number of cases proceeded on a basis which seemed to lack much 
appreciation of the importance of these ordinary everyday interactions. Case CC-44 was a 
particularly egregious example, where the child had been mainly looked after by the father on 
a day-to-day basis for a year. Allowing the mother to remove the child from the father’s care 
to join her abroad, the judge said this:  
 
Furthermore, and I know that the father will find it difficult to accept this, it seems to me 
that [the child] will have a better relationship with his father in many ways if regular 
contact takes place. I did get the impression ... that an awful lot of time that [the child] 
spent with his father was either at school or being fed or doing homework and not much 
of it was time for [the child] and his father to have fun together ... in what one might call 
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down time. This will be available to his father on contact.
85
 
 
Many would find this a truly extraordinary statement. Of course a large part of the week for a 
school-aged child involves being at school, having dinner and doing homework. The father 
was continuing to work full-time in his job, since that was the family’s only financial support, 
and weekends were often being spent having contact with the mother. To tell the father that 
losing the day-to-day care of his son would lead to ‘a better relationship’ was, at best, 
unfortunate language.
86
 Here we see direct engagement by the judge with the father, but the 
sexist undertone and detachment from the father’s own experiences as claimed in evidence 
are likely to have undermined the intended positive effect.  
 
Much the same sentiment can be found in case CC-56, though the case did not involve the 
same direct engagement between judge and parent. Here, the judge accepted that the father 
had been providing 65% of the children’s care for the three years since the parents’ 
separation. He had given up full-time work to do so, while the mother continued in her 
demanding job in London and started a relationship with a man (to whom she was now 
married) who lived in the USA. As the judge said, ‘[m]ainly her career but also her current 
marital choice have impacted upon her ability physically to spend time with [the children] 
though she has done her utmost’.87 Somehow, the fact that ‘a very high proportion of [the 
mother’s] contacts have been at extended weekends and thus there was proportionately more 
time available with the children’88 counted for more than the father’s daily commitment, 
because the mother was said to be providing a ‘pivotal emotional relationship’ such that ‘the 
welfare of the children is threatened by [her] inability to cope and thereafter to provide 
emotionally’.89 Despite the judge’s recognition that ‘[the father] undoubtedly loves his 
children and has been a good father to them, shouldering as he has the greater bulk of the 
parenting duties’,90 still the inherent qualities of the mother – who might alternatively have 
been thought to have behaved selfishly and without thought for the children – made her more 
suitable to care for them and justified a removal from the father’s care and from the 
jurisdiction.  
 
Where the judge allowed relocation, there was usually a statement to the effect that this 
father-child bond was strong enough to survive the resulting geographic separation. As one 
judge put it, ‘the fundamental strength of the relationship ... would not be impaired’.91 In 
another case, the judge thought that ‘[t]he quantity of contact will be reduced but the quality 
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will not in my judgment be affected’.92 Judges had ‘no doubt that the father will be 
devastated if permission to relocate is given’93 and endeavoured to make orders for on-going 
contact that reflected the fact that ‘[the] father remains hugely important ... and he will see 
[the children] just as often and for as much time as is possible’.94 
 
By contrast, a number of judgments in which relocation was refused expressed concern that 
the relocation might risk a loss of the meaningful relationship between the child and the 
father. In some cases, these concerns were based on a lack of confidence in the mother’s 
commitment to contact, but more often the perceived risk was based on a view that the 
distance involved and the consequent change in the nature of the relationship would be too 
serious for a meaningful relationship to survive. 
 
A majority of cases where this loss or damage was seen to be a ‘decisive point’ in refusing 
relocation involved an existing strong relationship between child and father,
95
 but in others it 
was thought that the child’s relationship with the father needed strengthening, and that 
relocation would prevent this from taking place; here, the relocation was prevented largely in 
order to improve a currently poor relationship.
96
  
 
These two classes of comment might suggest certain judicial (or legal) assumptions about the 
benefits of a strong father-child relationship.
97
 Relocation might be refused because of an 
existing strong relationship which was already important to the child, or might be refused 
because there was no such relationship and it needed to be built and strengthened. 
Conversely, relocation might be allowed because the parent-child bond was strong and would 
allow the relationship to survive the distance, or it might be allowed because the bond was 
not that strong and so the risk of loss was less important because the relationship was not as 
central to the child’s welfare as other factors.  
 
These judicial choices explicitly relate to the law’s present uncertainty about parenting norms 
and the importance of fathers in children’s upbringing. In 2014, after the cases in this study 
were decided, the Children Act 1989 was amended to include a so-called ‘parental 
involvement presumption’.98 This provision states, in short, that a parent should be involved 
in his or her child’s life unless it is not safe for that to happen, but that ‘involvement’ does not 
mean any particular division of time. While this new subsection has not yet been the subject 
of significant judicial consideration, either in general or in the relocation context specifically, 
Ryder LJ has said that in an international relocation case s 1(2A) is likely to ‘heighten the 
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court’s scrutiny of the arrangements that are proposed by each parent’.99 
 
 Effect of refusal on the applicant  
 
Set against this, judges considered the likely impact that a refusal of the application might 
have, where again judges seemed to be able to construct identical arguments leading to 
opposite conclusions. The issue of the effect of refusal is, perhaps, the area which most tests 
trial judges in the relocation context. In the wake of several Court of Appeal judgments in the 
early 2000s,
100
 a narrative was established that judges were required to find that there would 
be a substantial impact of refusal and that this factor would carry substantial weight in the 
overall analysis.
101
 While recent decisions have stressed that this is not the case,
102
 in an area 
like relocation, where most judges are inexperienced and may see a case only once every two 
or three years, it takes time for these changes to filter down. Consequently, judges may still 
see it as ‘safer’ to allocate considerable weight to the impact of refusal, while a finding that 
there would be little or no impact – or, even more so, that there would be impact but that it is 
outweighed in the overall evaluation – remains ‘braver’.103  
 
It is therefore noteworthy to find many judges pointing out – in line with the more recent 
authority
104
 – that the effect on the parent of refusing relocation was only one of many factors 
to be assessed based on the evidence in the case:  
 
I give no primacy to the mother’s application and do not adopt any approach which 
creates some presumption in her favour by attaching weight to the emotional and 
psychological impact upon the mother, or any consequential impact upon the child. These 
factors do, nevertheless, have to be considered as part of the overall balance.
105
 
 
In assessing a possible shift away from the one-time focus on the effect of refusal of leave, 
two trends can be noted. One, in the cases where relocation was refused, involves judges 
willing to find either that the impact of refusal would not be as bad as the mother thought, or 
that she was able to deal with that effect well enough.  
 
[A]lthough the mother would be very disappointed ... she would cope and ... she would 
not allow her disappointment to taint the loving relationship that either parent has with 
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the child. She would move on. Indeed, she said so herself in oral evidence.
106
  
 
[T]he mother will undoubtedly be extremely upset... [T]he Cafcass officer was of the 
clear view that the mother would cope ... [and] I formed the same view. ... I feel sure that 
the mother will cope in this country, as she has done for many years.
107
  
 
These cases – including some which seemed to involve judges instructing mothers that they 
were required to cope
108
 – illustrate the willingness of judges to find that the overall balance 
of the welfare assessment favours refusal of relocation, despite the effect on the applicant.  
 
The competing trend, where relocation was allowed, shows that a successful application can 
be brought without any reliance on the effect of refusal. In a small but substantial minority of 
cases, ‘the mother’s case is not put on the basis that she will suffer severely if not permitted 
to travel’.109 As another judge explained:  
 
This is not the kind of relocation case in which a mother states that she cannot continue 
with life in England... When asked how she would feel about the refusal of her 
application, the mother in effect said that she would just have to cope with it. ... In fact, 
unusually for an applicant, her situation in England is, I believe, considerably tougher 
than she admits.
110
 
 
Set against these cases were a sizeable number of applications which were allowed where 
judges clearly considered that the impact of refusal was a major consideration. In many of 
these, the judges linked their conclusion to specific parts of the evidence:  
 
If she was not allowed to go the nightmare ... that her life ha[s] become would continue, 
and I do not think that is an unfair way of describing it.
111
 
 
Mother was trying to hide how distressed she feels at her situation here... Her desire to go 
home and her devastation if she has to stay here were plainly genuine. ... I do think she 
will be devastated by a refusal. She was trying to be brave ... [but] she is trapped and 
worn down by life here.
112
 
 
If refused permission she would be very distressed and frustrated and would entirely 
blame the father. ... She would be badly affected if refused permission, with an indirect 
effect on [the child].
113
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However, in other cases, the conclusion that the mother would be ‘devastated’ seemed less 
compelling. In one case, the parents were operating a shared care arrangement in central 
London and the mother’s job at a large multinational company took her to Brussels on a 
regular basis; she proposed to move there full time, though her employer was content to have 
her based either in Brussels or in London. The judge’s view in this case that the mother 
‘would be extremely upset, indeed devastated, if she could not move to Brussels’114 seems, 
with respect, to overstate the case. The mother, irritated no doubt, would in all likelihood 
have carried on her life much as before, and perhaps in time sought a posting that required 
less travel (surely a possibility, given that she worked for a major international company with 
its global headquarters in London).  
 
This point was well made by another judge, who observed that ‘hyperbole has become 
jargon’115 at the start of eight full paragraphs dealing with the ‘devastation’ issue:  
 
Both counsel, and I am bound to say I, sighed when we heard the word ‘devastated’ yet 
again. The problem is that there is a limited vocabulary of words available to describe the 
extent of a person’s feelings of despair, loss, grief, fear, exasperation, frustration and 
disappointment, but in so saying I illustrate that there are other words than ‘devastated’. 
In the mother’s case, she told the father that the refusal of her wish to relocate would be a 
disaster. She would lose her identify, autonomy and independence; and, inevitably, she 
would be devastated. I found that to be a considerable overstatement of what is likely to 
be the truth.
116
 
 
That is not to say that the judge discounted the effect on her – it was considered and weighed, 
and the application was allowed. This judge was not alone, however, in expressing concern at 
the dominance of claims of ‘devastation’. Another judge, who also allowed the relocation 
application, found expressly that ‘M[other] will feel distress – but not devastation, as she said 
in evidence – if she does not [relocate]’.117 A number of cases where relocation was 
ultimately refused also commented on this point, with the word ‘disappointed’ featuring often 
as a likely impact; in one particularly telling case the maternal grandmother, giving evidence, 
‘thought her daughter would be devastated if leave were refused, but conceded that the word 
“devastated” was suggested to her by the mother’s lawyer’.118 
 
Children’s wishes and feelings 
 
An issue not mentioned expressly in the Payne guidance, though imported into it by its 
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reference to the welfare checklist, is the views, wishes and feelings of the children involved. 
Such wishes and feelings are principally brought into the family justice system through an 
officer from the Child and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (Cafcass) or an 
Independent Social Worker’s report. Such reports can be limited to the issue of the child’s 
wishes and feelings, though they tend to be much more wide-ranging and encompass all 
aspects of the case. A full welfare report typically carries great weight in parenting disputes; 
if the report includes a recommendation, judges are required to give specific reasons for 
rejecting that view if they reach a different conclusion.
119
 However, it has long been thought 
that Cafcass reports are less influential in relocation cases than elsewhere in child law.
120
 
Indeed, in the cases in this study, reports were not invariably ordered, often because the 
parties and the judge simply felt they did not need one.  
 
Where Cafcass reports were made, judicial reactions were mixed. One area in which judges 
were generally united, though, was that the report was important in relaying the wishes and 
feelings of the children involved. However, in practical terms, children’s views had quite 
limited impact in the judges’ reasoning in most cases. Since the mean age of children in 
relocation cases is just under 7 years, it is perhaps unsurprising that judges often simply noted 
that the children were ‘too young for [their] wishes to assist me’,121 or even that they were 
‘too young to express [their] wishes and feelings on the issues before the court’.122 
 
For children in middle childhood (roughly ages 5 to 10), the most common approach was to 
say that the issues were too complex for their wishes and feelings to carry much weight. 
While one may have some sympathy with this view, it should be remembered that the 
children were not being asked to decide the case, but rather to express their wishes and 
feelings about it. While these children may not ‘realise fully what would be involved’ in 
relocation,
123
 some showed real insight into what was being decided. One 7 year old who had 
been living in England for about three years rather wisely said to the Cafcass officer that ‘he 
missed his life in [the other country] but that if he was [there] he might just as well have been 
saying that he missed his life in England’.124 The judge thought that these expressed views 
‘don’t help me very much’ in making the decision, but one might have inferred that the child 
was aware of the benefits of his present life and was not expressing any desire to change.
125
 
 
Indeed, in other cases, children of this age did express views which influenced the decision-
making. Usually these were cases where the children’s views accorded with the outcome that 
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the judge had reached, such as Case CC-69, where the parents were in a high-conflict shared 
care arrangement which the judge thought was not working well. The judge reported this 
exchange when the 8 year old met the judge in person:  
 
I asked him ‘is there anything you want to say?’ And he said ‘I want to live with my 
mum’ and because he said that I felt I had to ask him ‘why?’ He said ‘when I see my 
mum my tummy doesn’t ache any more, and when I see dad my tummy aches’.126 
 
Unsurprisingly, in the handful of cases involving older children judges often said that their 
views ‘are something I have to give a lot of weight, albeit they are not determinative’.127 One 
13 year old spoke for many children when reporting that ‘she would, herself, [have] preferred 
not to have been asked’.128 Despite that, the judge found significant value in what the child 
said:  
 
she told [the Independent Social Worker] that she would be fine either way, [and] 
expanded that what she really wanted for herself (and I underline this for emphasis) was 
to move to the United States and go to school there, but she would miss her dad and 
would prefer it if dad moved there too and lived nearby.
129
 
 
Thus case outcomes generally accorded with older children’s wishes, but there were 
exceptions. In one case, relocation was granted in relation to a 13 year old boy who was 
described as ‘very apprehensive’ about the proposed relocation and who was ‘close to tears’ 
when discussing it with the Cafcass officer.
130
 Two cases involved the judges specifically 
discounting the views of older children, one because ‘she tells people what they want to hear 
– she is a people-pleaser’,131 and the other because the judge concluded that the children’s 
views had been unduly influenced by their mother and were therefore simply expressing her 
views rather than their own.
132
  
 
Overall, it is clear that in only a small minority of cases did the children’s views have any 
great influence on the decision. In a high proportion of cases their views were either not 
sought or were entirely dismissed – the child was ‘too young’ or their views were discounted 
for some other reason – and even in those cases where weight was being given to the child’s 
views, the impression from the judgments was that the decision would have been the same 
regardless of the child’s view. In other words, judges said that they were giving weight to the 
child’s views when those views aligned with their own conclusions about the outcome of the 
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case (a reinforcement approach), and found reasons to dismiss the child’s views when the 
outcome was not going to fit with them. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This is the first study in England and Wales that gives any insight into the outcomes of 
international relocation cases in the family court. While the two parts of the study show 
slightly varying results in places, the overall picture is clear and informative. We see, most 
crucially, that it cannot be said that relocation is automatically allowed – in this sample at 
least, something like 30 to 40% of applications were refused. We can also identify some 
variables which, overall, may be related to those case outcomes, such as the distance of the 
proposed move and the applicant’s current relationship status.  
 
Moreover, we have been able to look in detail at the reasoning that goes into making a 
determination in a relocation case. Presented with enormous amounts of evidence on wide-
ranging issues, trial judges have many choices to make. They have to decide what is relevant 
at all and in what ways it is relevant; they have to choose between competing (often directly 
contradictory) versions of the same events; and they have to make predictions about various 
possible futures for a child, with effects potentially lasting a lifetime. They then have to 
construct a narrative account of their choices which weaves together their findings and 
conclusions within the legal framework so as to allow the decision to be understandable, 
coherent and (ideally) with minimal scope for appeal.  
 
The research reported in this article tells us a great deal about the decision-making processes 
of judges in everyday relocation cases. We can see, in particular, that judges give very serious 
consideration to two main competing factors – the effect on the applicant of refusing her 
application, and the effect on the child’s relationship with the respondent if relocation goes 
ahead. These are assessed against the background considerations of the practicalities of the 
proposal (including considerable focus on the plans for on-going contact), and the 
motivations of both parents.  
 
In most cases, judgments were constructed such that all these aspects lined up to point 
towards the same conclusion. Sometimes that was, no doubt, an accurate reflection of the 
way in which the case had developed, but other cases raised some doubts, given that the same 
issue could be constructed to lead to exactly opposite conclusions: for example, a strong 
existing relationship between the child and the respondent could be seen as a reason to refuse 
a relocation (more to lose) or to allow one (relationship strong enough to survive the move). 
By contrast, a handful of judgments expressed genuine anxiety and uncertainty, which may 
more accurately reflect the reality of many relocation cases.  
 
More generally, the big question about relocation when these cases were decided was 
whether the Court of Appeal’s reinterpretation of Payne in K v K went far enough,133 or 
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whether the guidance itself needed to be rewritten. This research suggests a rather mixed 
answer to that question. 
 
A number of concerns were expressed about the ‘Payne in the light of K v K’ approach. 
Perhaps the main concern was that Payne was premised on there being a primary carer 
applicant, when many cases no longer fit that pattern. K v K (as understood after Re F
134
) 
demands that judges deal with this issue by weighing the Payne considerations differently, 
but there was a question as to whether Payne lends itself to such flexible interpretation.
135
 
Here, the findings of this research are somewhat equivocal. Some judges clearly understood 
that they were permitted to take this approach and did so with little apparent difficulty. In 
other cases, though, it appeared that Payne was applied fairly uncritically, despite being 
inappropriate to the facts of the case.
136
 Whether because of greater seniority, greater 
experience, less risk-aversion,
137
 or some other consideration, some judges readily modified 
the Payne guidance while others followed it closely as if it were a manual. This, in short, was 
the difficulty: there was a concern that K v K risked an inconsistency of approach and 
therefore of like cases not being treated alike. Moreover, as relocation cases are increasingly 
allocated to the District Bench, the Court of Appeal’s ability to have an overview of the 
general approach diminishes, since most applications for permission to appeal will now be 
heard by one of dozens of Circuit Judges rather than the handful of specialists in the Court of 
Appeal.  
 
It may be that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Re F (International Relocation Cases) in 
August 2015 has changed the picture somewhat. Here, Ryder LJ suggested that undue 
reliance on Payne’s guidance could amount to an appealable error of law, and that the 
‘required reading’ for a judge in an international relocation case no longer included Payne, 
but instead came principally from K v K and Re F (Relocation). Even in the lifetime of the 
cases in this study, Re F (Relocation) appeared to be helping to standardise understandings of 
the approach after K v K, and it may be that Re F (International Relocation Cases) goes even 
further in standardising a holistic, all-factor approach.  
 
Nonetheless, it may be wondered whether Payne will continue to exert influence, since it has 
still not been over-ruled. K v K, which Ryder LJ posits as the central case, is itself focused on 
the continued relevance of Payne, and thus working back through the authorities one still 
ends up with the guidance from that case. The concern, looking at the reasoning of judges in 
this study, is not that the issues raised by Payne are inappropriate in many cases; rather, it is 
the manner in which those questions are asked and the assumptions which underpin them 
(particularly in relation to the child having a single primary carer who is inevitably the 
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mother) which seem inappropriate, and asking judges to determine the extent to which that 
guidance is relevant on a case-by-case basis may be too much of a stretch.   
 
Indeed, it is difficult to see why the senior judiciary remains so attached to Payne. It cannot 
really be about precedent, because Payne is only guidance and the Court of Appeal has 
regularly abandoned one set of guidance in favour of another – that, indeed, is how Payne 
became the leading case in the first place. Despite the clarification from Re F (International 
Relocation Cases), it is time for the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court to look at this 
issue again from scratch, ideally by taking a number of conjoined appeals, with the aim of 
issuing new guidance that applies to all cases without relying on individual judges to make ad 
hoc modifications.
138
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
 
This appendix describes the way in which the dataset was generated, and the resulting 
limitations of the data in terms of their representativeness or otherwise of relocation cases as 
a whole which reduce the extent to which they may be relied upon to make inferential 
conclusions about this class of case generally based on statistical significance of any of the 
findings.  
 
The Court Case Sample 
 
The CC sample of cases was decided in the calendar year 2012 and gathered directly from 
trial judges and practitioners.
139
 Judges were contacted directly by email and letter. Initial 
contacts were made by Thorpe LJ, with follow-up communication through the Family 
Division Liaison Judges and the Designated Family Judges. Individual judges were also 
contacted personally where I received a ‘tip off’ that they had heard a relocation case 
recently. Individual judges were very helpful in sending materials when asked, but of course 
it is not possible to know how many decided a case but did not remember to send it in, or 
chose not to do so. Following a low response rate in the early part of the study, lawyers were 
then contacted in various ways to ask for their assistance, once it was clear that the 
President’s authorisation for the project allowed anyone who had a judgment or order to 
submit it to the project.  
 
The CC study was an attempt to gather the entire population of relocation cases heard in 
England and Wales that year. It is not suggested that this attempt was successful;
140
 96 
eligible cases were collected,
141
 but it is difficult to assess what proportion of the total 
population of relocation cases this is. Official records give some insight into how many 
international relocation cases are heard by the courts each year. Ministry of Justice statistics 
show that, in 2012, 384 children were the subject of orders allowing them to be removed 
from the UK following private law proceedings.
142
 However, caution may be needed in 
approaching this number. First, it is not clear how the MoJ data are collected, and so the 
likely accuracy of the number is difficult to assess. Second, it relates to the number of 
children, not the number of cases. There were 1.5 children per case in the CC sample which, 
if typical, would suggest something like 260 cases in total. Third, the MoJ data do not appear 
to differentiate between permanent and temporary leave to remove a child from the 
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this number gives some insight into the size of the CC sample 
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relative to the total number of cases. Assuming the figure of 384 children to be correct, and 
assuming 1.5 children per case on average, and assuming that holiday cases might amount to 
between 0 and 20% of those cases (though the number is unknown), the 96 cases in the CC 
sample would represent between 36 and 46% of cases. It is not possible to know whether the 
cases are representative or not, though having both lawyers and judges sending cases goes 
some way towards mitigating the risk of intentional bias on the part of those submitting 
material, since the incentives for the two professional groups to do so may differ. While a 
handful of judges and lawyers sent more than one case, the vast majority of individuals 
sending material sent just one case, and some cases were received more than once from 
different sources.  
 
 
 
The Research Questionnaire Sample 
 
In the final three months of 2012, a research questionnaire was distributed to family law 
practitioners throughout England and Wales. The questionnaire was intended to provide an 
alternative source of data about cases decided in 2012, to triangulate findings against the CC 
sample and check for possible biases in the case sample submitted to the study. It was also 
useful for bolstering the overall number of cases being considered, though both direct 
collection of cases for the CC sample and the questionnaire study for the RQ sample faced 
significant difficulties in obtaining responses from busy professionals.  
 
Most questions asked lawyers to provide detailed information about their most recent 
relocation case, designed to elicit information comparable with the data collected from the 
court cases themselves. Practitioners were asked to complete a questionnaire about their most 
recent relocation case, international or domestic, if they had done one in the previous 3 years 
(and also to send nil returns), and the questions then differentiated between type of case, year 
of decision, and mode of resolution (court adjudication or settlement). Some aspects of the 
RQ data suggest that some respondents may have reported their most recent ‘interesting’ case 
(however they saw that), since – for example – the sample appears in places to be skewed 
towards High Court decisions.  
 
The questionnaire was prepared in hard copy and online. 1,000 hard copies were distributed 
at practitioner conferences and by direct mail to chambers and family law firms around 
England and Wales, selected to get a range or large and small firms / chambers in all areas of 
the country. The online version was also advertised in articles and news items posted in 
practitioner journals and websites, and through the practitioner organisations Resolution, the 
FLBA, and the ALC. 187 completed responses were received, including 8 nil returns. While 
this number suggests a low response rate, it should be borne in mind that relocation cases are 
not everyday work for family lawyers, and a great many practitioners will not have done one 
in the last three years, even if they do private law children work. Of the 187 total responses, 
52 related to judicially determined international cases heard in 2012, and it is these 52 cases 
which are used in this paper, being directly comparable with the 96 CC cases.  
 Data Analysis 
 
This paper draws on a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods. For the purpose of the 
quantitative analysis, each case was entered into a database containing 84 fields, though no 
single case had data relevant to every field. These fields included basic information such as 
the number and ages of the children, the proposed destination country and the case outcome, 
but also more detailed information about process (such as location of court, type of judge, 
whether each party had a lawyer), the family (such nationality of parents, presence of wider 
maternal and/or paternal family in this country and in the proposed destination), and the 
outcome (such as the extent of contact ordered). Many fields simply did not apply to many 
cases (such as whether there were child protection concerns). But particularly where only an 
order (i.e. no judgment) was available,
143
 there were cases where more common fields could 
not be completed (such as the parents’ nationalities). Consequently, when it comes to analysis 
of the data, it is not always possible to consider all cases in relation to particular variables.  
 
The quantitative data were then analysed by Dr Ornella Cominetti, a statistician then at the 
Oxford University Department of Statistics. She used three primary techniques to assess the 
data: Pearson’s chi-square test, logistical regression models, and information gain score (IGS) 
analysis. While the first two are well known, IGS is a less common technique. IGS evaluates 
the worth of each variable by measuring the information gain of a variable to the class 
(where, in this research, the outcome variable is whether the relocation is allowed or not).
144
 
 
The qualitative analysis related to the 53 cases from the CC sample in which court judgments 
were available. The judgments were analysed using a broadly grounded methods theory, but 
one informed by the fact that many of the key issues being sought were known in advance 
based on the research questions – since the questions were partly about the use that is made 
of the Payne guidance, issues identified within that guidance formed part of the coding 
framework from the start. 
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